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1 
Introduction 
 
In his 2006 Nobel Lecture, Muhammad Yunus envisioned a future where poverty would 
be put "in museums."1 Such a world could be achieved, he argued, so long as the poor 
had access to the right resources, especially affordable credit. Development donors and 
the international community more generally echoed Yunus' enthusiasm for 
"microfinance," with the United Nations declaring 2005 the International Year of 
Microcredit.2 Indeed, the microfinance industry continues to grow in terms of the scope 
of potential borrowers and lenders as well as its monetary valuation, as websites like 
kiva.org allowed concerned "microlenders" in the Global North to make small loans to 
"microentrepreneurs" in the Global South. 
 Yet as microfinance transformed from a fringe form of poverty alleviation to a 
global industry, crises and fractures emerged that cast doubt on its advocates' claims of 
ending poverty. In 2007, not long after Yunus and Grameen Bank won the Nobel Peace 
Prize, the Mexican microfinance organization3 Compartamos held an Initial Public 
Offering (IPO) that earned its owners over $150 million and valued the company at well 
over $1 billion. The IPO attracted the attention of investment firms around the world, but 
it also called critics' attention to the interest Compartamos charged its borrowers, with 
effective rates approaching 90% on some loans.4 Yunus claimed that such interest rates 
amounted to usury and should not even be considered microfinance, while other actors in 
                                                        
1
 Muhammad Yunus, "The Nobel Lecture," 2006. 
2
 See the page for the International Year of Microcredit, www.yearofmicrocredit.org. It is worth noting that 
while microcredit and microfinance are sometimes used interchangeably, microcredit refers to the provision 
of credit to the poor, whereas microfinance refers to a broader array of financial services. 
3
 Henceforth referred to as MFIs. 
4
 Elisabeth Malkin, "Microfinance's Success Sets Off a Debate in Mexico." New York Times, April 5, 2008. 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/05/business/worldbusiness/05micro.html?pagewanted=all 
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the industry defended Compartamos' decision as necessary to the process of scaling the 
industry in order to meet the vast demand for credit in the Global South. 
 This debate took on an even greater urgency in the wake of the "Andhra Pradesh 
crisis," as hundreds of rural microfinance clients in the Indian state of Andhra Pradesh 
committed suicide due to heavy indebtedness. The crisis implicated some of the largest 
MFIs in Indian microfinance, heavily impacting first the regional, then the national, and 
finally the global market for microfinance. Furthermore, it emerged that field agents for 
the MFIs in question had in some cases encouraged insolvent borrowers to commit 
suicide so that the institution could collect life insurance or sell children into prostitution 
to pay their debts. Critics of the industry claimed that the Andhra Pradesh crisis 
demonstrated why microfinance does not work. Within the industry itself, different actors 
identified regulatory failure as the cause of the crisis, while others pointed to excessive 
commercialization; other advocates argued that it resulted simply from a few rogue MFIs 
abusing their power. The popular press articles on the crisis painted a drastically different 
picture from the one Yunus offered of industrious "microentrepreneurs" working their 
way out of poverty with the help of MFIs. 
 This project interrogates the microfinance industry's representations of the 
entrepreneurial poor. I argue that the microfinance industry represents and attempts to 
constitute a "microfinance subject," an entrepreneurial poor woman5 that the industry 
generally understands to be the same across the Global South. Yet I also argue that the 
microfinance industry recognizes that this subject must be constituted or "programmed" 
                                                        
5
 The bulk of microfinance loans go to women, and the microfinance industry represents them as the 
intended recipients and beneficiaries of loans. For more analysis on how the microfinance industry and 
development donors imagine women as the agents of economic growth and empowerment, see Katherine 
N. Rankin, "Social Capital, Microfinance, and the Politics of Development". Feminist Economics. 8 (1): 1-
24, 2002. 
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if microfinance interventions are to be successful. To constitute this subject, the 
microfinance industry produces and deploys networks (or agencements6) of technologies, 
personnel, knowledge, coalitions, and discourses. In what follows, I reframe the critical 
literature on certain aspects of microfinance practice to offer a performative perspective 
on the microfinance industry. In doing so, I aim to offer a picture of microfinance 
agencements as well as the forms and distributions of risk these agencements produce. 
 In order to offer a broad sense of the actors involved in the microfinance industry, 
its trajectory, and the history of its contestation, I begin in Chapter 1 with a brief history 
of the industry and its relation to and role in changing development paradigms. This 
history does not provide exhaustive detail, but rather some shared points of reference that 
serve as context for what follows. In Chapter 2, I explore a central fracture in the 
industry, between the "Bangladesh" and "post-Washington" approaches to microfinance.7 
Specifically, I look to two "monuments"8 of microfinance discourse, Muhammad Yunus' 
A World Without Poverty and Marguerite Robinson's The Microfinance Revolution, 
which advocate for the Bangladesh and post-Washington consensuses on microfinance, 
respectively. This chapter traces the key points of contention between these camps, but it 
also identifies key resonances such as their representation of an entrepreneurial poor, 
                                                        
6
 Following Michel Callon, "What Does it Mean to Say That Economics is Performative?" in Do 
Economists Make Markets? On the Performativity of Economics, edited by Donald A. MacKenzie, Fabian 
Muniesa, and Lucia Siu. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007. See also Chapter 3 of this project for 
further analysis of the term. 
7
 I borrow here from Ananya Roy the language of the "Bangladesh consensus" and "post-Washington 
consensus" on microfinance. See Poverty Capital: Microfinance and the Making of Development, New 
York: Routledge, 2010. 
8
 Following Iver B. Neumann, "Discourse analysis." In Qualitative Methods in International Relations: A 
Pluralist Guide, edited by Audie Klotz and Deepa Prakash, Plagrave Macmillan, London: 2008, 61-77. 
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what I refer to as a "microfinance subject."9 In Chapter 3, I argue that through competing 
agencements of skills, ideas, discourses, technologies, and coalitions, the microfinance 
industry attempts to constitute the "microfinance subject." Yet such agencements 
inevitably have unintended consequences, and I also offer an analysis of how the 
limitations of the industry's self-understanding become manifest in sporadic crises. In 
conclusion, I discuss in Chapter 4 the political and ethical implications of the 
microfinance industry's attempt to constitute "microfinance subjects," as well as 
alternatives to current microfinance practice. 
 This analysis of the industry operates on a few assumptions. I take as a point of 
departure the notion that the ideas, discourses, and languages deployed here are 
productive. I thus examine two "monuments" of microfinance discourse in order to 
examine how the microfinance industry understands its clients and the forms of 
subjectivity that it projects on the poor of the Global South. Yet I also argue that this 
literature is marked by a tension between the notion that the poor are "inherently 
entrepreneurial"10 and recognition of the need to instill this form of subjectivity in order 
for microfinance interventions to be successful. To explain how the industry manages this 
tension, I turn to the work of actor-network theorists such as Michel Callon, to situate 
microfinance discourse within a broader framework of social, technical, and material 
forces--or agencements--that shape economic life. Furthermore, I argue that fractures 
within the microfinance industry beget competing microfinance agencements, such as the 
                                                        
9
 Drawing here on David Williams' formulation of "liberal subjects" in "Constructing the Economic Space: 
The World Bank and the Making of Homo Oeconomicus," Millennium - Journal of International Studies. 
28 (1): 79-99, 1999. 
10
 Drawn from Christina Barrineau's quote on the UN Year of Microcredit, cited in Thomas W. Dichter and 
Malcolm Harper, “Introduction.” In What's Wrong With Microfinance? Rugby, Warwickshire, UK: 
Practical Action Pub, 2007. 
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Bangladesh and post-Washington camps on microfinance, which seek to equip 
microfinance clients with different forms of subjectivity. 
 This project contributes to a burgeoning literature that examines the microfinance 
industry from a performative perspective. Previous analyses of microfinance within this 
theoretical tradition have examined financial technique and knowledge production within 
the industry. While these are important contributions, the literature has neglected the 
relations that these agencements create between actors within the industry and clients or 
"microfinance subjects," which I argue is crucial to understanding the implications of 
contemporary microfinance practice. Furthermore, I argue in conclusion that identifying 
the nuances and risks of constituting "microfinance subjects" opens space for the creation 
of new--and better--microfinance agencements. 
 
  
6 
Chapter 1: The “Microfinance Revolution” Revisited 
 
While small-scale lending initiatives and credit cooperatives have existed for millennia, it 
was only in 1990 that the term “microfinance” came into widespread usage to describe 
the provision of financial services to the poor in the Global South.11 Interest in 
microfinance grew rapidly, and by the early 2000s some within the development donor 
community talked of a “microfinance revolution.”12 At around the same time, the World 
Bank began advocating microfinance as an alternative to the structural adjustment 
policies that had been integral to the development orthodoxy of the 1990s and as a way of 
ushering in a new development paradigm that prioritized social issues. This section 
addresses these trends, asking two related questions: first, what accounts for the rise of 
microfinance within the development donor community? And second, how did 
microfinance come to be understood as a challenge to neoliberal development orthodoxy? 
To fully answer these questions, I first offer by way of background a brief history of “the 
microfinance revolution.” This history in no way purports to be exhaustive; rather, it 
presents a number of moments or events that operate as shared reference points in the 
history of microfinance and the parallel history of its contestation. 
 Many histories of microfinance begin with Muhammad Yunus providing informal 
loans to a group of poor women in rural Bangladesh. This experiment eventually grew 
into a formal financial institution and Grameen (or “Village”) Bank was born. Yunus 
begins his personal narrative of involvement with microfinance by recounting the poverty 
                                                        
11
 Hans Dieter Siebel, “Does History Matter? The Old and the New World of Microfinance in Europe and 
Asia.” Paper presented at From Moneylenders to Microfinance: Southeast Asia's credit revolution in 
institutional, economic and cultural perspective, National University of Singapore, 7-8 October 2005. 
12
 Marguerite S. Robinson, The Microfinance Revolution. Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 2001. 
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that he saw in Bangladesh, and especially the effects of the 1974 famine.13 Seeing the 
results of “market failure” firsthand while at the same time teaching economics at the 
University of Dhaka led him to recognize “the emptiness of those theories in the face of 
crushing hunger and poverty.”14 To Yunus, the theoretical and structural limitations of 
capitalism—which he tellingly refers to as a “half-developed structure”15—meant that 
mainstream finance could not address the growing needs of those living in poverty. In 
this sense, Yunus depicts himself as an outsider looking in on the banking industry and 
development orthodoxy more broadly. Yunus claims that this position constituted an 
advantage innovating a new approach to poverty alleviation, arguing that “because I am a 
practical-minded person who initially had no experience in rural development or banking, 
I was relatively free of the preconceived ideas that tend to limit the thinking of most 
people in the field.”16 For Yunus, the growth-led model of poverty reduction championed 
by the development donor community was only part of the solution to global poverty.  
 Yunus' key innovation in addressing financial exclusion, however, was not 
extending credit to the poor, but developing a method of ensuring high repayment rates 
from poor borrowers without needing physical collateral that could easily scale. In the 
Grameen Bank's “lending circles,” continued access to credit for any one borrower was 
contingent on complete repayment from every borrower in the group. Yunus understood 
that pressure from within communities created a strong incentive to repay, and thus 
created a system that placed the onus of disciplining borrowers onto a community or 
                                                        
13
 Yunus 2006. 
14
 Yunus 2006. 
15
 Muhammad Yunus and Karl Weber, Creating a World Without Poverty: Social Business and the Future 
of Capitalism. New York: PublicAffairs, 2007: 18. 
16
 Yunus and Weber 2007. 
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lending circle, as opposed to the lending institution itself.17 The lending circle thus differs 
from both informal lending, which often involves moneylenders pressuring borrowers 
directly to repay, as well as formal credit provision, which generally requires some form 
of physical collateral.  
 The scaling of this model depended in large part on institutional support from the 
development donor community. While the “Grameen model” attracted some attention 
from scholars and local development practitioners in the 1980s, the larger development 
donor community invested little in the way of funding or institutional support.18 This 
apathy towards microfinance resulted in part from the World Bank's development 
orthodoxy at the time, which stressed the importance of investing in human and physical 
capital, ends towards which microfinance held little promise. There was also concern at 
the Bank that microfinance was “too leftish” to fit within their agenda.19 But as the 
development orthodoxy shifted in the mid-1980s, from a policy of creating human capital 
to one of structural adjustment, microfinance started to gain traction among the 
international development donor community. The World Bank and other donor 
institutions began to invest heavily in Grameen “clones” around the world.20 Institutional 
investment in microfinance did not merely expand access to financial services for the 
poor; it turned microfinance, which until then had remained a largely grassroots 
movement, into a global industry, precipitating the commercialization of microfinance.21 
                                                        
17
 John Adams and Frank Raymond, "Did Yunus Deserve the Nobel Peace Prize: Microfinance or 
Macrofarce?" Journal of Economic Issues. 42 (2): 435-443, 2008. 
18
 Milford Bateman and Ha-Joon Chang, “The Microfinance Illusion." Unpublished manuscript, 2009 
http://www.microfinancetransparency.com/evidence/PDF/App.3%20Chang%20Bateman%20article.pdf 
19
 Bateman and Chang 2009. 
20
 Adams and Raymond 2008. 
21
 Deborah Drake and Elisabeth Rhyne, The Commercialization of Microfinance: Balancing Business and 
Development. Bloomfield, Conn: Kumarian Press, 2002. 
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 The World Bank and other institutions in the development donor community also 
sought to professionalize the field of microfinance.22 They established the Consultative 
Group to Assist the Poor (or CGAP; originally known as the Consultative Group to Assist 
the Poorest).23 CGAP, housed at the World Bank, produces voluminous literature on 
“best practices” in microfinance, hosts workshops, and holds a great deal of sway in the 
production of microfinance knowledge.24 More practically, the creation of CGAP 
represented a largely successful effort on the part of development donors to bring 
microfinance into the fold of standard development practice. The creation of CGAP 
consolidated pre-existing support for microfinance from governments, development 
institutions, practitioners, and NGOs. 
 Large-scale donor institutions also expended a great deal of effort in promoting 
microfinance through other avenues, notably a set of conferences that culminated in the 
Microcredit Summit of 1997.25 While Yunus remained involved with and advocated for 
the expansion of microcredit, a key divergence in the microfinance movement had 
emerged between the World Bank model and the Grameen model. The World Bank’s 
foray into microfinance shifted the emphasis from local ownership and grassroots 
institutions to expanding mainstream finance firms and incorporating microfinance and 
institutional production of knowledge within the larger framework of international 
development. These efforts to promote and expand microfinance during the mid-2000s 
solidified the industry's standing among development donors and the broader 
                                                        
22
 Dichter and Harper 2007. 
23
 This shift from "Poorest" to "Poor" perhaps reflects CGAP's position in debates about whether the very 
poorest populations should receive credit. I elaborate further on this debate and CGAP's role in it in 
Chapter 2. 
24
 Roy 2010. 
25
 Dichter and Harper 2007. 
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international community, as evidenced by the United Nations' declaration of 2005 as the 
"International Year of Microcredit" and the awarding of the Nobel Peace Prize to Yunus 
and Grameen Bank in 2006. 
 While the rapid expansion of the industry generated enthusiasm for microfinance, 
it also created tremendous controversy. In 2007, mere months after Yunus was awarded 
the Nobel Peace Prize, Compartamos, a Mexican MFI, raised $467 million from private 
investors in an Initial Public Offering (IPO). While Yunus quickly denigrated the owners 
of Compartamos as the “new usurers,”26 industry observers saw the Compartamos IPO as 
an inevitable outcome of the commercialization of microfinance. As one microfinance 
consultant noted in the immediate aftermath of the IPO, “Compartamos is the first but 
they won’t be the last”27 (a prediction borne out by ensuing MFI IPOs). The conjunction 
of enthusiasm for microfinance in the abstract and outrage over the commercialization of 
for-profit microfinance exposes the tensions that arise from competing conceptions of 
microfinance both as a poverty-alleviation and development tool and as a lucrative 
financial market. 
 The Andhra Pradesh crisis of 2010 further underscored the significance of these 
tensions. In the immediate aftermath of the client suicides, microfinance advocates 
quickly wrote off the crisis as an isolated phenomenon resulting from the abusive 
practices of a few bad MFIs. It subsequently emerged, however, that some MFI field 
agents had pressured highly indebted borrowers to sell daughters into prostitution or 
                                                        
26
 Abhijit V. Banerjee and Esther Duflo. Poor Economics: A Radical Rethinking of the Way to Fight Global 
Poverty. New York: PublicAffairs, 2011. 
27
 Quoted in Malkin 2008. 
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commit suicide so their families could collect life insurance to pay off their debts.28 
Furthermore, some of the largest and most profitable Indian microfinance firms (SKS, 
Share, Spandana) were implicated in the crisis,29 vividly illustrating the potential dangers 
of large-scale commercial microfinance. The involvement of well-known and highly 
profitable players in the microfinance seriously damaged the credibility of the 
"microfinance revolution."30 
 The Andhra Pradesh crisis also called attention to the changing nature of the 
microfinance industry's relation to the broader development donor community. Changes 
within the industry occurred in conjunction with and in some sense because of large-scale 
changes in the theory and practice of development from the 1980s on. In the 1970s and 
1980s, there was little overlap between the broader development agenda and the goals of 
the microfinance industry. The World Bank and other large donor institutions understood 
development in terms of investments in human capital31 as well as physical capital 
(especially through investment in large infrastructure projects).32 Neither of these 
development emphases generated much interest in microfinance, which most 
international donor institutions understood as a fringe form of poverty alleviation. In the 
                                                        
28
 Philip Mader, “Rise and Fall of Microfinance in India: The Andhra Pradesh Crisis in Perspective.” In 
Strategic Change 2, 2013: 55. 
29
 Elisabeth Rhyne, "On Microfinance: Who's to Blame for the Crisis in Andhra Pradesh?" Huffington Post, 
November 2, 2010. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/elisabeth-rhyne/on-microfinance-whos-to-
b_b_777911.html. SKS had also held a highly publicized and controversial IPO earlier in 2010, in which 
the company was valued at approximately $1.5 billion (see Chen et al 2010, 
http://www.cgap.org/sites/default/files/CGAP-Focus-Note-Indian-Microfinance-Goes-Public-The-SKS-
Initial-Public-Offering-Sep-2010.pdf). 
30
 In India, the crisis destroyed not only MFIs’ reputations but also their bottom lines. Following reports of 
mass suicide, the government of Andhra Pradesh issued an ordinance banning most forms of repayment 
collection MFIs practiced. Though in theory the ordinance allowed MFIs to function, in reality most 
microfinance institutions simply shut down in Andhra Pradesh, which accounted for 30% of Indian 
microfinance (see Mader 2013). 
31
 Umud Dalgic, "International Expert Organizations and Policy Adoption". Cultural Dynamics. 19 (1) 
2007: 5-38. 
32
 David Williams, International Development and Global Politics: History, Theory and Practice. London: 
Routledge, 2012. 
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mid- to late-1980s, however, the World Bank and other multinational development 
donors began investing heavily in microfinance.33 This surge of interest and investment 
in microfinance resulted largely from an ideational shift within donor institutions and 
national governments towards neoliberalism.  
 Microfinance as a development tool complemented neoliberal development 
orthodoxy in a number of respects. For neoliberal development theorists, commercial 
microfinance offered a new means of bringing the poor within the fold of formal markets, 
and one that did not require significant state or civil society expenditures. Neoliberal 
development theorists introduced and popularized the notion of the “informal sector,” 
arguing that economic activity in the global south largely takes place outside the 
boundaries of market capitalism.34 Informal activity, these theorists argued, was both less 
efficient than work “inside” capitalism, and further was not exchangeable on the market. 
Microeconomic development practice during this period thus concerned itself with 
turning dead assets into productive capital by moving them “inside” capitalism.35 By 
connecting poor micro-entrepreneurs with financial markets and encouraging them to 
invest in their businesses, neoliberal development theorists hoped that microfinance 
would contribute to the formalization of economic life throughout the global south.36 
 This expansion (or formalization) of markets was accompanied by the relegation 
of the state to highly delimited roles throughout the Global South. Responding in part to 
the failure of Eastern Bloc socialism and the end of the Cold War, and in part to 
                                                        
33
 Bateman and Chang 2009. 
34
 Dalgic 2007. 
35
 As evidenced for example by Hernando de Soto's attempt to formalize housing throughout the global 
south—see Timothy Mitchell, “The Properties of Markets.” In Do Economists Make Markets? On the 
Performativity of Economics, edited by Donald A. MacKenzie, Fabian Muniesa, and Lucia Siu. Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2007. 
36
 Dichter and Harper 2007. I return to the role of the informal sector in the imagination of microfinance 
interventions in Chapter 3. 
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widespread budget crises, governments and donor institutions introduced “Structural 
Adjustment Policies," which entailed the elimination of a vast number of public sector 
jobs as well as rollbacks in state-sponsored social welfare programs intended to mitigate 
unemployment and poverty. Access to capital became one of the development donor 
community's favored solutions to the dislocation caused by wholesale elimination of 
social welfare and state protection, and for some states all but entirely substituted for the 
provision of social services.37 The development donor community's reliance on 
microfinance became especially pronounced as the formal private sector in the Global 
South failed to absorb the resulting un- and under-employment of former civil servants.38 
 For microfinance advocates, the absorption of the poor into formal economic 
spaces also made possible their social empowerment. Industry-affiliated think tanks such 
as CGAP and the Grameen Foundation disseminated numerous case studies showing how 
economic initiative allowed poor women to mitigate patriarchy within their community 
or members of untouchable castes to improve their standing.39 Since many critics 
attacked neoliberalism for making women and disadvantaged groups bear much of its 
cost, the notion that microfinance could simultaneously generate growth and address 
social inequality while requiring limited or no state involvement found a great deal of 
traction in the development donor community. 
 The industry's social turn opened up discursive space for the reframing of 
microfinance that took place around the turn of the millennium, as “antidevelopment” 
movements sought to contest neoliberal development practice. These movements, 
                                                        
37
 Dalgic 2007. 
38
 Julia Elyachar, "Empowerment Money: The World Bank, Non-Governmental Organizations, and the 
Value of Culture in Egypt.” Public Culture. 14 (3): 493-513, 2002. 
39
 See for instance Robinson 2001. 
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involving widespread protests such as the “Battle in Seattle” as well as academic and 
political contestations of neoliberalism, made “development” anathema to international 
organizations. As Julia Elyachar notes, “development...had evidently been given a 
discursive burial. No one wanted to defend development anymore—not even the World 
Bank.”40 In this context, the project of expanding access to financial services took on new 
significance, as microfinance became a way for development donor institutions to 
distance themselves from the language of "development.” 
 Donor institutions, microfinance-oriented think tanks such as CGAP, and 
microfinance firms accommodated this new role in part by reframing microfinance 
discursively. Language about empowerment, local ownership, and social capital began to 
crop up in the microfinance literature. These discursive shifts offer insight into how 
microfinance came to operate as what Elyachar terms “the inverse of development.”41 In 
particular, the increasing frequency with which language about “social capital” appears in 
texts produced by donor institutions speaks to the urgency of incorporating social issues 
into mainstream development discourse. Just as the microfinance industry sought to 
reframe their mission around empowerment and gender, the World Bank, in its (self-
appointed) role as “knowledge bank,” sought to reframe development through the 
concept of social capital.42 Social capital continues to play a role in debates about 
microfinance and development more broadly,43 while development and research 
institutions deploy the concept in various ways.44 More precisely, argue that the 
                                                        
40
 Elyachar 2002: 494. 
41
 Elyachar 2002: 494. 
42
 Ben Fine, Social capital versus social theory: political economy and social science at the turn of the 
millennium. London: Routledge, 2001. 
43
 Roy 2010. 
44
 While Fine argues that the concept has recently (and rapidly) fallen out of fashion at the World Bank, he 
notes that the discursive implications remain, particularly in light of the term’s continued usage in debates 
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microfinance industry and development donor institutions use to the concept of social 
capital to coopt antidevelopment movements in order to further neoliberal interventions. 
 Debates about the role of social capital in development policy have often been 
characterized by fierce contestation of—and perhaps outright confusion about—what the 
term actually signifies. The World Bank’s 2000-2001 “Voices of the Poor” report, one of 
the first Bank documents to deploy the concept, defines "social capital" in terms of "the 
benefits of membership within a social network.”45 These networks can entail familial, 
professional, or communal ties, and serve as a safeguard against various crises. The 2000-
2001 World Development Report introduces the idea that social capital enables poor 
people in the Global South to create economic opportunity out of community ties, 
arguing that “social norms and networks are a key form of capital that people can use to 
move out of poverty.”46 Here, social relations supplement other forms of capital that the 
poor use to mitigate poverty. 
 Writing against this understanding of social capital, Fine argues that academic and 
development institutions deploy the concept in order to bring social and historical issues 
into the inherently asocial, ahistorical framework of market individualism. For Fine, this 
represents the colonization of the social sciences by neoclassical economics.47 Due in part 
to its accommodation of social issues within an essentially economic framework, the 
                                                                                                                                                                     
about development and social policy. See Ben Fine, Theories of Social Capital: Researchers Behaving 
Badly, London: Pluto Press, 2010. 
45
 Deepa Narayan-Parker, Can Anyone Hear Us? New York: Published by Oxford University Press for the 
World Bank, 2000: 55. 
46
 World Bank, World Development Report 2000/2001: Attacking Poverty, Oxford University Press 2001: 
10. 
47
 Fine 2001. In this analysis, social capital owes less to the radical sociology of Pierre Bourdieu than it 
does to market individualist thinkers such as Gary Becker, James Coleman, and Robert Putnam. Anthony 
Bebbington, writing in response to Fine and other critics of social capital, notes that some development 
institutions have used Bourdieu’s understanding of social capital, though he also concedes that this occurs 
somewhat rarely and that these institutions are generally relatively weak branches of larger multilateral 
institutions (see Anthony Bebbington, "Social Capital and Development Studies II: Can Bourdieu Travel to 
Policy?" Progress in Development Studies 7 (2) 2007: 155-162). 
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World Bank and other donor institutions deploy social capital discourse strategically in 
response to antidevelopment movements. Within the domain of development, critics of 
"social capital" argued that its market individualist framing constructed an inherently 
entrepreneurial poor, who would respond to the burden of state and market failure 
through the maximization of their social capital.48 At the same time, the language of 
“solidarity” and “empowerment” that recurs in the social capital literature evokes 
“histories of transformative movements that tended to challenge (rather than 
accommodate) dominant cultural and political ideologies.”49 More broadly, the 
deployment of "social capital" in official development discourse underscores the 
development donor community's attempt to balance a newfound emphasis on "social 
issues" within a broadly asocial, neoliberal framework. 
 Bebbington et al., defending the World Bank's understanding of social capital, 
argue that while the term may distract from underlying political-economic issues, it 
nonetheless serves the valuable purpose of introducing social issues to World Bank 
debates.50 Within the World Bank, the introduction of social capital debates responded to 
long-standing critiques of development institutions for their failure to focus on social 
issues and approach development holistically.51 For critics of social capital, however, the 
Bank’s appropriation of this language entailed less an introduction to social issues than a 
co-optation of these issues. By taking the social “half-seriously,”52 debating social capital 
arguably forestalls macro-level change. This is borne out by the observation that while 
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World Bank language has shifted, World Bank policy has not: the increased traction of 
social capital in the development community had little bearing on adjustment lending.53 
 Instead, the deployment of "social capital" coincided with (and, as argued above, 
was in some measure responsible for) broader changes in the way development 
institutions, academics, and practitioners talked about development. Whereas at the turn 
of the millennium antidevelopment and anti-globalization movements agitated against 
structural adjustment and massive economic and sociopolitical disparities between Global 
North and South, broader debates about development turned to the social aspects of 
poverty. The UN’s Millennium Development Goals indicated a fundamental shift in the 
conceptualization of poverty, and, along with massive philanthropic involvement from 
wealthy donors, created a sense that “ethical capitalism” might rescue development from 
itself.54 This also came alongside a reframing of poverty by influential economists such 
as Joseph Stiglitz and Amartya Sen, who understood it not only in terms of material 
deprivation but also insecurity or risk to realization of one’s potential.55 
 The notion that microfinance enabled community-led development lent the 
industry well to a reframing around the concept of social capital. At the level of group 
lending, for instance, one microfinance researcher notes that the “use of social capital has 
proved an extremely effective form of collateral and exemplifies the importance of trust 
and relationships in economic development.”56 In Yunus’ vision, microfinance existed 
precisely because the poor had no collateral; the Grameen model depended instead on 
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social pressures to enforce repayment.57 In the social capital model of microfinance, 
social pressure—the mechanism for enforcing repayment that characterizes Grameen 
“clones” around the world58—actually consists of individual borrowers offering social 
capital as collateral against potential default.59 In this conception, microfinance involves 
poor borrowers risking their social capital in an entrepreneurial manner to generate 
growth in both their economic and social capital. Furthermore, as I will argue in Chapter 
3, social capital not only reframes development discursively, but also refers to a set of 
practices and social technologies that allow the microfinance industry to reshape social 
relations in order to realize the kind of subjectivity imagined in microfinance discourse. 
 The newfound emphasis on social capital has also allowed MFIs to reframe their 
mission in terms of empowerment, local solidarity, and grassroots movements. Ananya 
Roy notes that at the 2011 Microfinance USA conference, the opening speakers declared 
that they were “building a movement, not an industry,”60 arguing that while this claim 
perhaps belied the nature of the conference, it also pointed to the industry’s need, in the 
wake of the Andhra Pradesh crisis, to reframe itself in non-commercial terms. Yet such 
reframing had already been going on for some time before the Andhra Pradesh crisis. The 
framing of microfinance had taken a distinctly social turn around the turn of the 
millennium.61 In a process analogous to the World Bank’s reframing of “development,” 
CGAP reoriented the mission of the microfinance industry around "social" goals. A 
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CGAP report from 2003 on the possibility of using microfinance to achieve the 
Millennium Development Goals concludes that: 
Microfinance is unique among development interventions: it can deliver these 
social benefits on an ongoing, permanent basis and on a large scale. Many well-
managed microfinance institutions throughout the world provide financial 
services in a sustainable way, free of donor support. Microfinance thus offers the 
potential for a self-propelling cycle of sustainability and massive growth, while 
providing a powerful impact on the lives of the poor, even the extremely poor.62 
 
In this analysis, microfinance presents a unique opportunity to address vast disparities 
between the Global North and Global South in such areas as health and education, while 
also allowing donors to reduce their investments in these areas. This explains in large part 
the development donor community’s enthusiasm for the expansion of microfinance. Such 
optimism about the potential of microfinance is borne out in policy and scholarly 
literature, where microfinance is offered as a potential solution for issues ranging from 
Koranic prohibitions on moneylending to the difficulties of post-conflict peace-building. 
 Yet the tensions arising from the microfinance industry’s self-declared 
transformation from industry to movement raised further questions. Critics of the 
industry’s use of “social capital” noted that the use of the concept to explain good 
microfinance practice and outcomes was highly arbitrary.63 Furthermore, the industry 
failed to differentiate between different kinds of social capital and thus ran the risk of 
exacerbating hierarchical or oppressive (e.g. patriarchal, classist) social relations.64 As 
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Katharine Rankin notes, “common moral frameworks are not in themselves desirable 
planning objectives.”65 
 The 2011 Microfinance USA conference offered the industry an opportunity to 
resolve these tensions in light of the Andhra Pradesh crisis. Thus, the industry sought not 
only to reframe itself, but also to characterize the problems it faced as a result of “bad” 
microfinance. The opening speakers offered a narrative wherein overly commercialized 
firms that did not take sufficient account of “culture” had wrought devastation and havoc 
on borrower communities. These practices—characterized as usury by Yunus and other 
industry members critical of commercialized microfinance—had, in their search for 
profits, gone too far in making use of social pressures. The answer, the speakers claimed, 
was increased attention to social relations and culture on the part of the MFIs to prevent 
the recurrence of "bad" microfinance.66 
 The irony of this turn lies in the fact that the industry’s reformulation of social 
relations into social capital—that is, understanding these relations in terms of 
entrepreneurialism and risk-taking—led MFIs to intervene in the social lives of 
communities at a larger scale and at a level that made abusive lending practices more 
likely. By addressing “social issues” through “social capital,” the microfinance industry 
risked creating new forms of risk for borrowers; even Robert Putnam, the famous 
theorizer and proponent of social capital, noted that using social capital to these ends 
could have catastrophic consequences, as “so strong can be the norm against defection 
[from the Rotating Savings and Credit Association] that members on the verge of default 
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are reported to have sold daughters into prostitution or committed suicide.”67 This 
observation points to the difficulties the industry faces in balancing its claims of 
empowering the poor and the intensified forms of risk they ask the poor to take on to 
achieve this kind of empowerment. 
 While Yunus and other microfinance advocates blamed the rash of borrower 
suicides on “usury” and “loan sharks,” the conjunction of enthusiasm for microfinance in 
the abstract and outrage over the methods MFIs use to enforce repayment underscored 
the tensions arising from the competing roles of microfinance as a tool in the fight against 
poverty and as a lucrative financial market. Bearing this tension in mind, I examine the 
microfinance industry's representations of the poor and deployment of "social capital" not 
as "researchers behaving badly"68 but rather in terms of the industry's construction of 
entrepreneurial "microfinance subject." In the next chapter, I examine how two 
"monuments" of microfinance discourse understand the subjectivities that microfinance 
interventions instill in clients. While this analysis identifies divergences between the 
approaches these texts take in understanding "microfinance subjects," I also point to key 
commonalities between them, most notably the inherent entrepreneurialism of this 
subject. Furthermore, I situate this theorization in networks of social forces that actors in 
the microfinance industry deploy so that the industry can realize the conditions of its own 
possibility. 
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Chapter 2: Constituting the "Microfinance Subject" 
 
Despite receiving the Nobel Peace Prize in 2006, Muhammad Yunus was by that time 
struggling to assert his presence in the movement he had started.69 The “microfinance 
revolution” had led to an unprecedented expansion of the microfinance industry, 
accomplished in large part through the commercialization of microfinance. Yet certain 
microfinance insiders, Yunus among them, argued that commercialization brought about 
the very problems that the microfinance industry set out to solve, notably indebtedness, 
abuse of borrowers, and new forms of financial and social exclusion. 
This rift in the industry, between what Ananya Roy terms the post-Washington 
and Bangladesh consensuses on microfinance, characterizes debates about microfinance 
to this day. For Roy, the post-Washington consensus celebrates commercial and 
“sustainable” (i.e. for-profit) microfinance. Due to this emphasis, actors within this 
consensus often argue that sustainability is a necessary first step to outreach, and so will 
not loan to the extremely poor or destitute. CGAP organizes this consensus, not only by 
producing knowledge about microfinance (in the form of technical reports, field manuals, 
country evaluations, and so on) that confirms the value of sustainability, but also by 
organizing conferences, holding training sessions, and generally disseminating a form of 
“best practices” microfinance consistent with post-Washington consensus values.70 
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The Bangladesh consensus, conversely, champions Grameen’s “double bottom 
line” of social benefits and economic profitability.71 Aside from creating tangible policy 
differences within the microfinance industry, this emphasis led Grameen to pursue a 
number of innovations, such as “social business,” wherein businesses reinvest their 
profits with a view towards generating social benefits (as opposed to increasing profits). 
Though the Bangladesh consensus looked to be getting drowned out by the scale of 
investment and institutional support behind the post-Washington consensus sometime in 
the early 2000s, the Compartamos IPO and Andhra Pradesh scandal have stoked 
skepticism about commercial microfinance, leading many within the industry to search 
for alternatives.72 
In this chapter, I analyze two “monuments”73 of microfinance discourse that are 
representative of the two sides of this split, and have played an important role in 
stimulating debate around these topics. The first key text is Marguerite Robinson’s 2001 
book The microfinance revolution, a curious blend of history, anthropological findings 
about the poor of the global south, microeconomic analysis, and client testimonials to the 
power of microfinance. The book was published at the height of enthusiasm about the 
power of commercial microfinance, nearly coinciding with the publication of other books 
on the subject such as Deborah Drake and Elisabeth Rhyne’s The commercialization of 
microfinance.74 The second text is Yunus’ 2007 book Creating a world without poverty: 
social business and the future of capitalism. Though the text is primarily concerned with 
Yunus’ attempt to pioneer social business, it also examines the “microcredit revolution” 
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that inspired his work in social business.75 Published shortly after Yunus won the Nobel 
Peace Prize, the text was released at the height of his popular appeal (his acceptance 
speech serves as the epilogue to the book). 
I depart here from previous analyses of microfinance discourse in not only 
analyzing texts and their productive effects, but also situating these texts and the 
interventions they make possible within a broader framework of social and technical 
forces. In this chapter, I examine the ways in which the microfinance industry 
understands poor borrowers and constructs them as economic agents, before exploring in 
the next chapter how this form of agency is situated within and constrained by 
knowledge, institutions, practices, and technologies. While Robinson’s and Yunus’ texts 
both represent “microfinance subjects” with salient commonalities across geographies, I 
argue that microfinance as a set of interventions varies locally according to its practice, 
mediation, or contestation. Furthermore, I show how this local variation plays out in the 
texts, where the theorization of a universal “microfinance subject”76 is rendered unstable 
when confronted with what Gibson-Graham aptly terms “the richness of individual 
subjects’ economic lives.”77 
The Microfinance Revolution revisited 
 
Robinson’s book takes as its point of departure the distinction between the “financial 
systems” and “poverty lending” approaches to microfinance.78 Robinson not only 
advocates for the financial systems approach, but excludes poverty lending altogether 
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from her definition of the microfinance revolution with which she opens her book: “The 
microfinance revolution is the process—recently begun, but under way in many 
developing countries—through which financial services for the economically active poor 
are implemented on a large scale by multiple, competing, financially self-sufficient 
institutions.”79 Robinson lumps Grameen Bank “and some of its replicators in other 
countries” into the category of poverty lending.80 Perhaps attempting to counter the 
authority of Yunus, a proponent of the poverty lending approach, Robinson traces the 
roots of commercial microfinance to nineteenth-century microlending in Europe. This 
history casts doubt on Yunus’ “invention” of microfinance (perhaps rightly so), but it also 
downplays the indebtedness of contemporary commercial MFIs to the Grameen model’s 
lending circles, which made it possible to scale microfinance services.  
While excessive commercialization later became the industry’s favored 
explanation of the abuses that caused the Andhra Pradesh scandal,81 the early 2000s were 
a time of great enthusiasm for the possibilities of commercial microfinance.82 “Best 
practices” in microfinance at the time unreservedly endorsed the financial systems 
approach,83 and as financial institutions recognized that microfinance presented a 
potentially lucrative new market commercial microfinance spread rapidly. In this context 
of unbridled enthusiasm, Robinson’s use of the term “revolution” to describe this 
development caught on within the microfinance industry and among its allies. 
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This enthusiasm for commercial microfinance coincided with the development 
donor community’s shift towards prioritizing social issues in development. Not long 
before The microfinance revolution was released, Narayan et al’s Voices of the poor 
report had raised hopes among those who sought to reform development institutions such 
as the World Bank for taking social issues seriously.84 The title of Robinson’s “Voices of 
the clients” section plays on this language, calling attention to the industry’s attempt to 
position itself as part of a new way of thinking about development which prioritizes the 
needs of the poor. The section, which includes testimonials of microfinance clients from 
sixteen different countries, also reinforces the text’s ability to speak authoritatively about 
issues concerning the poor. 
 Robinson notes that “this is not a chapter for statisticians; nothing here is 
statistically significant.”85 In an endnote to this section, Robinson offers both a critique of 
existing studies of microfinance and a defense of this approach: 
As a social anthropologist, I am skeptical about the quality of most studies of the 
impact of microfinance on clients’ incomes and enterprises. Such studies are far 
more difficult to carry out at a high level of quality than most people realize. I 
have been living in villages in different countries when survey teams have come 
through asking people about their incomes, assets, debts, participation in 
development programs, use of credit, and so on. I have also been there when the 
teams leave and the respondents laugh among themselves about what they told the 
‘silly people with the pencils’ (as one Indian villager put it).86 
 
Robinson continues by detailing how her approach of soliciting narratives through 
successful MFIs allows for a meaningfully diverse representation of client voices.87 Thus, 
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the text establishes its authority in this section through asserting its nuanced 
understanding of microfinance clients. 
Somewhat counter-intuitively, however, this broad array of client voices is 
primarily characterized by its uniformity. In her comments preceding the “Voices of the 
clients” section, Robinson asserts the fundamental similarity of the poor throughout the 
global south in terms of their demand for financial services. Underpinning this claim is 
the notion that the poor are inherently entrepreneurial, and only lack access to the right 
services to fully realize these qualities:  
 
Coming from widely varying cultures, economies, and environments, there are, of 
course, differences among them. But in my experience, market women in Kenya talk 
essentially the same business language as market women in Bolivia. Farmers from 
India and Mexico share similar concerns about crop finance. And in Dhaka 
(Bangladesh) and Jakarta (Indonesia) slum dwellers who want to store their small 
savings safely seek a place with many of the same characteristics.88 
 
 
The poor, then, are characterized by the similarity of their needs, suggesting that largely 
similar interventions will work across geographies and urban/rural divisions. That the 
poor frame their needs in “business language” further positions microfinance as an 
intervention suitable to solving these problems. 
 Understanding the poor as inherently entrepreneurial also suggests that they are 
well suited to microfinance. In a subsection entitled “Do Poor People Understand 
Microfinance Products and Services, and Do They Know How to Use Them?” Robinson 
argues that because the poor have experience managing scarce resources, they will 
skillfully navigate the world of financial services: 
Financial experts would be hard pressed to teach people like the Peruvian market 
woman, the wife in the rural Bangladeshi farm family, or the Indonesian waitress 
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how to maximize their resources or how to use available financial services better 
than they already do. If financial services suitable for their needs are available, 
these people know well how to use them.89 
 
In the text, the poor are necessarily financial experts in their own right—by virtue of the 
fact that they are poor. This allays concerns (more or less identical to those Yunus 
confronted when he began Grameen Bank) that the poor, and especially the rural poor, 
are not “bank-minded.”90  
  Furthermore, Robinson argues that access to financial services bolsters the self-
confidence of clients and helps them become more independent. For one client, her 
entrepreneurial skill allowed her to improve her standing in the community and achieve 
her familial goals as a mother: 
BR said that she has gained confidence in her roles as wife, mother, and 
businesswoman. “Earlier I could not even express myself or stand before people.” 
Now she has set aside bricks to build a house, she pays the children’s school fees 
from the brickmaking business, and she and her husband have plans to build a 
pub. “I have a happy marriage and my husband respects me. My children are also 
happy and respect me because I can provide for them and feed them.”91 
 
Here, the text shows a microentrepreneur using the MFI’s services to realize her 
subjectivity, offering not only economic empowerment but also giving her the confidence 
to “stand before people.” Throughout the “Voices of the Clients” section, poor people 
from around the world establish their agency through microfinance. 
Yet not all the poor are, in Robinson’s view, capable of becoming "microfinance 
subjects." Rather, she distinguishes between the “economically active” and “extremely” 
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poor. At the level of MFI policy, the most obvious manifestation of this distinction is that 
the financial systems approach “advocates commercial microfinance for the economically 
active poor and other, subsidized and charitable nonfinancial methods of reducing 
poverty and creating jobs for the extremely poor.”92 The distinction between these two 
kinds of poor people points to a need for a specialized intervention for each group (that 
is, microfinance for the economically active poor and charity for the extremely poor). As 
Robinson puts it, “the poorest of the poor should not be the responsibility of the financial 
sector.”93 
Robinson notes, however, that the distinction between the economically active 
and extremely poor “is not precise.” While the term “extremely poor” generally refers to 
those make less than 75 cents a day, Robinson understands the “extremely poor” 
specifically as those who either cannot access employment or otherwise are otherwise 
unable to work (due for instance to displacement, social exclusion, or disability). 94 
Robinson qualifies this distinction in two ways. First, the extremely poor can in some 
instances become economically active, or vice-versa.95 Membership in one of the groups 
is not so much tied to the individual characteristics of a poor person as to situational 
factors such as indebtedness, illness, or lack of access to employment. If circumstances 
change, the text suggests, an “extremely” poor person could transition into economic 
activity. Second, the economically active poor do not always meet all the criteria 
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Robinson offers. Rather, they are simply those who meet some of these benchmarks and 
are considered “creditworthy.”96 
In one of her footnotes elaborating on the distinction between the economically 
active and extremely poor, Robinson clarifies that this categorization draws from Henry 
Mayhew’s categorization of poverty in London Labour and the London Poor: 
Mayhew’s (1968 [1861], vol. 4, pp. 22–23) classic four-volume study of poverty 
in 19th century London remains the most comprehensive source on different 
kinds of poverty, shown from the point of view of the poor themselves. Mayhew 
divides the population of Great Britain into four categories: those who will work, 
those who cannot work, those who will not work (vagrants, beggars, criminals), 
and those who need not work. In the terminology used here, the extremely poor 
would include many in Mayhew’s second category and some in his third category. 
Access to formal sector commercial microfinance could help the economically 
active poor in his first category and some of those in his second category.97 
 
In actuality, Robinson’s categories as deployed in the text owe more to the later work of 
Charles Booth, a late-Victorian era theorist who revised Mayhew’s categorization and 
opted for a distinction between the “very poor” and the “laboring” poor. For Booth, as for 
Mayhew, such a distinction implied a moral judgment against those who would not work-
-a category curiously absent from Robinson’s analysis.98 In her construction of a hard-
working, entrepreneurial poor, Robinson downplays the “undeserving” poor, who are 
subsumed by the category of “those who cannot work.” 
This distinction breaks down altogether when Robinson presents the stories of 
individual borrowers. The following interview between an elderly microfinance client 
and a representative of the Bangladeshi MFI that serves her, which appears in the 
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“Voices of the Clients” section, offers an account of an extremely poor client engaging in 
economic activity: 
AF: As you see, I am a widow. I have no son anymore. If I don’t save, what will 
happen to me when I can’t work anymore? 
SKS: Would you mind telling me what is your work? 
AF: You see, I am an old woman. I can’t work. So I go from door to door. 
SKS: Please don’t mind, do you mean you are a beggar? 
AF: What else can an old woman like me do? 
SKS: Is it hard work? 
AF: Not very. I go out only a few hours, and I don’t go every day. It is enough. 
The people are good. I don’t need anything but food. 
SKS: Even so, you save more than some working people do! 
AF: Of course. They have jobs and sons. They don’t need to save like I do, do 
they?99 
 
Perhaps the most puzzling aspect of Robinson’s inclusion of this interview, at least from 
the point of view of the debate between the Bangladesh and post-Washington camps, is 
that in this analysis the extremely poor benefit more from microfinance than do the 
economically active poor. More immediately, however, this interview also underscores 
the instability of the distinction between the economically active and inactive. To wit, a 
beggar who fails to meet Robinson’s criteria for economic activity due to her inability to 
obtain formal employment is not only manifestly economically active, but noteworthy in 
this regard. Furthermore, Robinson asserts that the categories of extremely and 
economically active poor are not fixed—that is, that they denote conditions and not states 
of being, and as such extremely poor individuals can become economically active.  It is 
unclear, however, how this can happen except through economic activity. 
  In spite of the tensions in the text, however, The Microfinance Revolution 
became a touchstone for debates within and about the microfinance industry. Meanwhile 
Yunus, with the ascendance of CGAP and the financial services approach to 
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microfinance, was becoming a more marginal figure in the industry. While the 
microfinance subject constructed by Yunus’ text shares key attributes with Robinson’s 
“economically active” poor, Yunus also attempts to put his own stamp on the 
“microcredit revolution.” 
Yunus: Creating a world without poverty 
 
While The Microfinance Revolution frames microfinance as only one poverty-reduction 
tool among many, Yunus’ book holds higher aspirations for the "missing piece of the 
capitalist system."100 For Yunus, a university economist by training, the inspiration for 
microcredit resulted from his first-hand experience with market failure during the 
Bangladesh famine of 1974. Working on an irrigation project in a rural village, he 
concluded that the degree to which the challenge the villagers he worked with faced was 
not so much a lack of productivity but indebtedness due to abusive lending practices by 
moneylenders. Yunus organized a project with his students to hand out small loans to 
victims of the moneylenders. The villagers paid these loans back, and Yunus' experiment 
with microcredit had begun. 
 Yet in Yunus' account, providing credit to the poor is not so much a question of 
correcting market failure as fundamentally reshaping capitalism. Integral to Yunus’ 
notion of microfinance is the concept of access to financial services as a human right. By 
his own account, local bankers scorned his efforts to provide credit to the poor. Yunus 
argues that this attitude entails "a worldwide system of apartheid."101 As Ananya Roy 
notes: 
this approach sees microfinance as explicitly distinct from, and even opposed to, 
commercial banking. Yunus has repeatedly emphasized that microfinance is not 
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banking at the bottom of the socio-economic structure; instead it is about turning 
banking on its head. In short, it is about remaking capitalism.102 
 
From its inception, Grameen prioritized poverty-reduction and low interest rates over 
financial sustainability. Yunus argued that while Grameen was sustainable, international 
aid should nonetheless be mobilized to expand access to donor-subsidized microfinance.  
 Recognizing better than most the division in the microfinance industry between 
the Bangladesh and post-Washington consensuses, Yunus addresses this question in the 
text. Crucially, however, he reframes this division in terms of interest rates charged to 
borrowers. He offers a categorization that distinguishes between "poverty-focused" and 
"profit-maximizing" microcredit institutions.103 Whereas Robinson argues that the latter 
can more sustainably address poverty, Yunus argues that their interest rates are 
"moneylenders' territory," and that furthermore "because of the high interest they charge, 
these programs cannot be viewed as poverty-focused but rather are commercial 
enterprises whose main objective appears to be earning large profits for shareholders or 
other investors." Yunus concludes that such institutions should not properly be 
considered MFIs. Thus, while Robinson argues that the "poverty-lending" approach is not 
part of the microfinance revolution, Yunus places profit-maximizing microcredit 
institutions outside of the microfinance industry as a whole. Leveraging his credentials as 
the founder of contemporary microcredit, he offers a parting shot at the post-Washington 
consensus on microfinance: "microcredit was created to protect the people from 
moneylenders, not to create more moneylenders."104 
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 In spite of this dispute over how microfinance institutions should approach 
lending to the poor, however, Yunus' text shares with Robinson's a language of 
entrepreneurialism. While Yunus remains skeptical about unfettered capitalism in its 
current manifestation, he insists on the value of hard work for the poor to lift themselves 
out of poverty: "Grameen Bank offers the poor not handouts or grants but credit--loans 
they must repay, with interest, through their own productive work."105 Like Robinson, he 
depicts the poor as entrepreneurs whose work will flourish within the right structures. He 
also echoes her emphasis on economic activity, quoting from a letter sent from an 
American friend who visited rural Bangladesh and called it "an incredible bee hive [sic] 
of economic activity...in practically every house or yard you pass, you see people at 
work, making or fixing or preparing things for trade." This scene offers a visible contrast 
to the economically depressed counties of rural America, the friend believes, where 
economic activity is indiscernible. The presence of the entrepreneurial poor of the Global 
South106 remains a distinct aspect of microfinance discourse across consensuses. 
 Superficially, Yunus' treatment of "economic activity" would seem to be more 
encompassing than Robinson's. Grameen, he notes, has a microlending program 
specifically for beggars, which charges no interest and allows them to establish their own 
repayment schedule. Such an arrangement violates a number of tenets of the financial 
services approach to microfinance, notably that such loans are not "sustainable" and 
because such beggars fall outside the bounds of "economic activity" in Robinson's terms. 
Yunus' program, however, illustrates the instability of this binary between the 
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economically active and extremely poor, since many of these borrowers use these loans 
to sell goods door-to-door, and some (Yunus estimates as many as ten percent) eventually 
graduate and start taking out larger loans at interest. The poor, for Yunus, are united by 
their entrepreneurialism. 
 Yunus' description of Grameen's social agenda suggests that Grameen also 
provides a structure within which borrowers create and perform an entrepreneurial 
identity. This performance most notably manifests itself in the "Sixteen Decisions" 
adopted by Grameen's borrowers. Some of the Decisions encourage borrowers to be 
frugal ("6. We shall plan to keep our families small. We shall minimize our 
expenditures"), while others pertain to health, housing, and sanitation. Such Decisions 
offer a sense of the byproducts of a prosperous, growing community. Most explicitly, 
however, a few decisions appeal to the need to work hard to achieve prosperity and 
economic growth, as a responsibility to borrowers' families and communities: "1. The 
four principles of Grameen Bank--Discipline, Unity, Courage, and Hard Work--we shall 
follow and advance in all walks of our lives. 2. We shall bring prosperity to our familes." 
Decision 13 most clearly reflects the entrepreneurial nature of the Decisions: "For higher 
income we shall collectively undertake bigger investments." Grameen actively seeks to 
instill these principles in its borrowers, for as Yunus notes, "every new members of the 
bank is expected to learn the Sixteen Decisions and to pledge to follow them."107 Yunus 
shows that Grameen not only offers resources to poor entrepreneurs, but also creates 
more entrepreneurs from within the ranks of the poor. 
 It is worth remembering that for Yunus, this creation of new entrepreneurs is also 
made possible by a new kind of institution attempting to create a new kind of economics. 
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While the emphasis on "higher income" through "bigger investments" might suggest that 
Yunus views capital accumulation as an end in itself, he voices skepticism at several 
points in the text on precisely this question, arguing that people are not motivated only by 
the desire for profit and that the structure of capitalism needs to incorporate social 
concerns. In seeking to remake capitalism "from the bottom up," he suggests that 
microcredit is the beginning of a larger process of rethinking capitalist institutions--the 
next step of which he hopes to realize with social business. Paradoxically, then, Yunus' 
book is saturated both with the rhetoric of the entrepreneurial poor and admonitions of 
the capitalist system for not offering an outlet for such entrepreneurial energy. 
Encountering antidevelopment 
In this section I analyzed two "monuments" of microfinance discourse to examine how 
they mapped onto debates within the industry. The texts in question represent two 
divergent perspectives on microfinance--what I have opted to call the Bangladesh and 
post-Washington consensuses, following Ananya Roy--though what distinguishes these 
approaches is also a matter of contention within the texts themselves. Yet in spite of these 
differences, both texts engage in the construction of an entrepreneurial poor able to grow 
their assets if given the chance. 
 Paradoxically, this appeal to market values--rooted at least partly in Victorian-era 
beliefs about the deserving poor, as I note in reference to Robinson's distinction between 
the "extremely" and "economically active" poor--serves to counter antidevelopment 
movements by emphasizing poor entrepreneurs and their rootedness in communities, 
even as the MFIs simultaneously engage in the process of constituting these 
entrepreneurs. Elyachar's apt observation that "microinformality is where 
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antidevelopment found its development home"108 underscores the microfinance industry's 
success in framing entrepreneurialism in social terms. The monuments in question serve 
not only to construct the poor in particular ways, but also are engaged in producing a 
particular kind of economic rationality for poor borrowers and for the development donor 
community. 
 The texts diverge, however, in terms of how subjects can realize this agency and 
what conditions subjects must escape to do so. Yunus' text frames his experiment with 
and innovations in microlending as a response to the historically longstanding problem of 
predatory moneylending. Addressing the power imbalance between moneylenders and 
poor women--and the ultimate transformation of the latter into microentrepreneurs--
assumes a centrality to the "microcredit revolution." Yunus' text critiques the practices of 
commercialized MFIs for recreating the exploitation inherent in moneylending under the 
guise of microfinance. Yunus' narrative, then, underscores not so much the problem of 
the poor's lack of access to capital, as the need to change the particular social and power 
relations conditioning such access. 
 Robinson's text refers only in passing to the legacy of moneylending, perhaps for 
fear of inviting the comparison that Yunus draws between commercial MFIs with high 
interest rates and usury. In her text, technical--rather than social--barriers prevent the 
provision of formal, secure financial services to the poor.109 In arguing that the key 
condition preventing the entrepreneurial poor from expanding their economic and social 
capital is lack of access to capital, which in turn would allow "microfinance subjects" to 
subvert oppressive social relations within their communities, Robinson's text inverts 
                                                        
108
 Elyachar 2002. 
109
 See for instance Robinson 2001: 35, excerpted in this paper at the beginning of Chapter 3. 
  
38
Yunus' narrative about access to capital and exploitation. In this view, informal 
moneylending becomes an important predecessor to the contemporary microfinance 
industry, that contemporary MFIs, through superior techniques, have transcended. 
 This rift over the nature of the "microfinance subject" plays out not only at the 
level of discourse, but in terms of the technologies, coalitions, cultural norms, and 
personnel the Bangladesh and post-Washington camps deploy and assemble in attempting 
to produce this subject. These divergent assemblages, in turn, bear on how the 
"microfinance subject" relates to the MFI and thus on how she is produced. In what 
follows, I examine the process by which actors in the microfinance industry equip clients 
to become "microfinance subjects." Yet the production of the microfinance subject is not 
so straightforward as her theorization, and in this vein I show that crises in microfinance 
demonstrate the limitations of the industry's self-understanding. 
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Chapter 3: Economic Performativity, Microfinance, and the Politics of Development 
Nearly every economist I meet asks the same question: if formal sector 
microfinance is profitable, and if there is high demand, why has the demand not 
been met? The primary answer is the lack of appropriate and efficient financial 
technology and the lack of information that prevailed until recently.110 
 
Economic Performativity Theory 
The two "monuments" of the microfinance literature examined in Chapter 2 offer a 
distinction between the ways in which the Bangladesh and post-Washington camps 
construct microfinance subjectivity. Yet while these subjectivities differ in certain 
respects, the texts also point to certain commonalities intrinsic to the industry's 
imagination of the "microfinance subject." In both Yunus' and Robinson's texts, the poor 
of the Global South intuitively understand finance, work hard, and use their assets 
masterfully to manage their household income and grow their capital. Both texts argue 
that good MFIs provide the capital necessary for the entrepreneurial poor to reach their 
full potential. 
 Yet there is also a tension in this narrative, for much of the debate over "best 
practices" in the microfinance industry concerns how to ensure client responsibility and 
repayment. In a 1995 training session organized by USAID Cairo, a consultant explained 
the value of understanding culture in ensuring high repayment rates among microcredit 
borrowers: "In every culture there is something that works, and the thing is to find out 
what that is. Is it the headman, the religious leader, community pressure, or the police? 
Find out what it is, and use it."111 My own exposure to the disciplinary apparatus of MFIs 
came in 2012, when a microfinance practitioner teaching a class for my study abroad 
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program in Senegal defended his decision to have insolvent borrowers thrown in jail, 
arguing that it was the only way to prevent widespread defaults. Both cases speak to the 
disciplinary power necessary to constitute new entrepreneurs from the ranks of the poor 
in the Global South. 
 Following Lasse Henriksen's observation that "questions of epistemic domination 
and control in the performativity of economics have been at the periphery of the narrower 
performativity research agenda,"112 I attempt to reconcile extant critiques of microfinance 
with a performative perspective on the microfinance industry. I argue there remains a gap 
between the theorization of an entrepreneurial poor in the texts I have analyzed and the 
more ambiguous realities of microfinance practice. In this chapter, I review selections 
from the literature on economic performativity theory in order to reframe the relation 
between microfinance theory and practice in terms of its mediation along the lines of 
culture, knowledge, power, institutions, personnel, and technologies. Furthermore, I 
argue that this mediation does not always produce "felicitous" results.113 Rather, events 
such as the Andhra Pradesh crisis and the Compartamos IPO, as well as widespread co-
optation of MFI projects by poor clients who repurpose them for their own needs,114 point 
to the limitations of the industry's understanding of the agencements at play. 
 Economic performativity theory takes as its point of departure the premise that 
economics is not a science that observes something external to itself, but rather is 
implicated in creating the worlds that it describes. In this view, as Timothy Mitchell aptly 
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puts it, "the effectiveness of economics rests on what it does, not on what it says."115 This 
perspective suggests that economic theory is at its core political, for, as Mitchell notes,  
in helping to constitute the apparent border between the market and the 
nonmarket, economics contributes to the work of sociotechnical mechanisms that 
reorganize how people live, the political claims they can make, and the assets they 
can control.116 
 
Economic interventions, then, are inherently normative and political projects. David 
Williams' critique of the World Bank anticipates this claim in noting that IOs and NGOs 
"are engaged in very intrusive interventions in the pursuit of the creation of rational 
subjectivity."117 Such a process is analogous to the way in which MFIs attempt to create 
microfinance subjects through the disciplinary mechanisms of social pressure or police 
force. 
 Yet the performative view of economics does not equate economic theory with a 
self-fulfilling prophecy, which would suggest that any new theory is equally well suited 
to reshape economic life. Rather, the particular "sociotechnical agencements" at play--
that is, different materialities, social forces, ideologies, arrangements of power, and so 
on--contribute to whether and to what degree a theory can contribute to "the construction 
of the reality it describes."118 In order for economic performativity theory to contribute to 
an understanding of economic life it must be understood not merely as a critique of 
economic theory, for "to view economics as a body of ideas is far too narrow, for 
economics also consists of people, skills, datasets, techniques, procedures, tools, and so 
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on.”119 This approach avoids the reductionism of viewing economics as a totalizing, 
misrepresentative discourse and rather situates it among other productive forces that give 
a fuller picture of--to return again to Gibson-Graham's formulation--the "the richness of 
individual subjects’ economic lives."120  
 Understanding economics not as a science studying phenomena external to it but 
rather as a field where actors deploy competing forms of expertise, authority, legitimacy, 
and ownership to reshape economic life means also viewing the project of "development" 
in these terms. In this vein, Timothy Mitchell's essay "The Properties of Markets" 
reframes Hernando de Soto's work on the formalization of property rights in the Global 
South in terms of the political and sociotechnical interventions it makes possible. 
Specifically, Mitchell takes issue with de Soto's argument that the "secret" to successful 
capitalism lies in instituting formal property mechanisms at the level of the state. By 
turning "dead" (informal) assets into "live" (formal) capital, de Soto argues, the poor of 
the Global South can use their assets, in particular their homes, as collateral with which 
they can access the credit economy. For de Soto, this transition makes greater capital 
accumulation possible for the poor and ultimately paves the way for the success of 
markets in spaces that de Soto believes currently fall "outside" the boundaries of 
capitalism.121 Yet as de Soto notes, this reorganization of economic life necessitates a 
redistribution of risk that actually makes the poor of the Global South less secure.122 I 
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will return shortly to the theme of redistributing risk in the context of the microfinance 
industry. 
 Mitchell's insight is to identify the ways in which de Soto's work is a 
"(mis)representation,"123 while also taking seriously the productive power of his ideas 
and the agencements underpinning them. De Soto has effectively built a consensus 
behind his theories through his think-tank, the Institute for Liberty and Democracy (ILD). 
Through de Soto's connections with influential policymakers and neoliberal theorists, the 
ILD has obtained bid-free contracts from heads of state in the Global South to implement 
his prescribed policies.124 De Soto's arguments also resonate with the development donor 
community and international organizations in part, Mitchell argues, because they deploy 
the trope of the poor as entrepreneurs lacking only the right structural conditions to 
succeed.125 These political, social, and discursive conditions underpin an agencement that 
allows for the realization of de Soto's model in spite of academic economists' concerns 
over its empirical rigor. 
 The economic performativity theory literature offers a new perspective on debates 
about "development" and microfinance that take for granted the microfinance industry's 
discourse of the entrepreneurial poor, or interrogate it solely in terms of its value as a 
(mis)representation. Just as sociotechnical agencements underpin de Soto's theorization 
of an entrepreneurial poor, other discourses, coalitions, techniques, and personnel form 
agencements that mediate the theorization and constitution of the "microfinance subject." 
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Furthermore, while much of this mediation is "felicitous" (that is, the conditions required 
for the realization of the world the industry is predicated on are met), I argue that crises 
such as the mass suicides in Andhra Pradesh can be attributed to the limits of the 
industry's understanding of these agencements. My goal in this analysis is not to identify 
every actor, technology, or social force at play in microfinance agencements, but rather to 
reformulate themes that I have already examined in terms of the economic performativity 
theory literature. In what follows, I first revisit the debate between the post-Washington 
and Bangladesh consensuses on microfinance, outlined in Chapter 2. I then turn from the 
larger IOs that generate microfinance knowledge to the MFIs that deploy it in order to 
produce "microfinance subjects." Having outlined the role that institutions perform in this 
agencement, I review the technologies that MFIs deploy in attempting to produce 
"microfinance subjects," paying particular attention to the role of "social capital." In 
conclusion, I examine the implications of a performative understanding of microfinance, 
calling attention to the reallocation and intensification of risk for the "microfinance 
subject." 
Constituting the "Microfinance Subject" 
While Chapters 1 and 2 underscored the fracture within the microfinance industry 
between the Bangladesh and post-Washington camps, the attempt to constitute an 
entrepreneurial "microfinance subject" remains a relatively constant facet of the literature 
on microfinance practice across this divide. This process resonates with critiques of the 
role NGOs play in forming what David Williams terms "liberal subjectivity" among the 
poor of the Global South, speaking to the power institutions wield in making micro-level 
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interventions regardless of their appeal to the subjects in question.126 The constitution of 
such subjects, as Tom Young puts it, entails "programming, not propositions."127 Young 
and Williams' observations point to a need for greater attention to the processes by which 
MFIs must equip the poor of the Global South with technologies, skills, languages, and 
resources to realize a particular form of "calculative agency."128 
 Yet the "liberal subjectivity" identified by Young and Williams, characterized 
primarily by its internalization of and adherence to neoliberal norms, does not capture the 
specificity of the subjectivities129 that MFIs attempt to produce. Rather, four key traits of 
the "microfinance subject" recur in the microfinance literature. First, she is 
"tremendously entrepreneurial."130 Having been forged by the experience of managing 
scarce resources, she uses her assets masterfully to expand her microenterprise and 
accumulate economic and social capital. Second, the "microfinance subject" is based on 
the gendered model of "rational economic woman." This belief in the "hidden 
entrepreneurial qualities" of the third-world woman means that the majority of 
microfinance loans are made to women.131 Much of the literature on the social benefits of 
microfinance underscores the benefits communities in the Global South could reap from 
women realizing this kind of agency. Third, the microfinance subject remains poor only 
because structural conditions prevent her from realizing her full potential (though 
precisely which structural conditions the industry must remedy remains a point of 
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contention across the camps). Finally, the "microfinance subject" is fundamentally 
similar around the world: she speaks the same "business language," faces the same 
obstacles, and is amenable to the same interventions.132 
 Crucially, however, the industry also predicates much of its "best practices" on 
the notion that the "microfinance subject" does not exist prior to microfinance. David 
Williams' claim that NGO and IO interventions in the Global South constitute an attempt 
to instill "liberal subjectivity" (rather than presupposing its existence) suggests that MFIs 
must constitute "microfinance subjects" in order for the industry to realize the conditions 
of its own success.  
 Furthermore, while the "microfinance subject" theorized by the industry remains 
generally constant across fractures, the Bangladesh and post-Washington take different 
approaches to realizing her production, creating competing agencements that differ along 
the lines of the discourses, coalitions, personnel, and technologies they deploy. In what 
follows, I revisit aspects of the microfinance industry that I have touched on previously, 
and reframe them in terms of their role in microfinance agencements, with special 
attention to the roles of the Bangladesh and post-Washington camps in creating 
competing agencements and the various felicity conditions underpinning these 
agencements. 
 Coalition-building and knowledge production are integral processes in the 
constitution of both camps. For the post-Washington consensus, CGAP plays a crucial 
role in organizing and equipping other actors within this camp. CGAP tracks supply and 
demand for microfinance funding through a repository known as the Microfinance 
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Informations Exchange (or "the MIX").133 Given the microfinance industry's reputation 
for being fractured, poorly defined, and difficult to monitor, the MIX serves the important 
function of creating a clear and accessible market for microfinance funding. CGAP also 
produces microfinance "experts" with the appropriate skills and values through the 
Boulder Institute, a training institute for microfinance professionals to learn industry 
"best practices."134 CGAP supplements the creation of skilled practitioners with 
voluminous knowledge production. The production of experts and expertise allows for 
the creation of a market for microfinance. 
 Private actors also play an important role in equipping post-Washington 
consensus MFIs with the tools to commercialize. Aitken identifies three processes that 
enable what he terms "micro/financialization," namely valuation, intermediation, and 
securitization.135 Valuation refers to the processes that establish the value of 
microfinancial assets. Some MFIs--notably Compartamos136--have established this 
valuation through Initial Public Offerings (IPOs), transferring ownership of these MFIs 
into the hands of "private financial agents."137 Intermediation, in turn, refers to the 
processes by which financial agents can access MFIs as formal, investable objects. Firms 
often accomplish this through the use of "micro-credit investment vehicles," or MIVs, 
which in turn rely on networks of financial partners, charities, and microcredit recipients. 
MIVs, then, allow investors to "access micro-borrowers as an increasingly mainstream 
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financial asset."138 Finally, securitization allows MFIs to disperse their risk throughout 
markets through, for instance, Collateralized Debt Obligations (CDOs). These techniques 
reflect the importation of financial technique from the Anglo-American "center" of 
finance to the "edges" of the global financial economy, enabling the dispersion of risk 
MFIs take on in lending to the poor into formal financial markets. Furthermore, MFIs that 
began as non-profit organizations have, by holding IPOs and offering CDOs, transformed 
into commercialized MFIs accessible as mainstream financial assets.139 
Commercialization occurred, then, not so much as a result of "consensus" but rather due 
to the establishment of techniques that allowed Bangladesh camp MFIs to rapidly 
commercialize by transforming how they disperse risk, and the creation of a regularized, 
formalized market that made commercial MFIs accessible assets.140 
 The Bangladesh camp, in turn, counters these techniques of commercialization 
with agencements more conducive to their model of microfinance. While CGAP's role as 
a "clearing house"141 for microfinance research has no exact corollary within the 
Bangladesh consensus, the Grameen Foundation produces microfinance knowledge and 
technologies with a view towards building coalitions around their approach to 
microfinance. Thus, the Grameen Foundation not only advocates for a greater emphasis 
on social issues in microfinance, but also measures the social impact of investments 
through the Progress Out of Poverty Index.142 This approach differs starkly from the post-
Washington camp approach to social issues, which views them as secondary to the 
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business of microfinance. Furthermore, the Grameen Foundation produces knowledge 
centered on Bangladesh consensus values, particularly with regards to the social impact 
of investment. This knowledge production has allowed Grameen to build a network of 
international organizations, MFIs, NGOs, and private corporations143 around the 
Bangladesh consensus on microfinance. 
 Although both camps must create markets for microfinance, their approaches to 
creating these markets differ. The agencement underpinning the post-Washington 
approach to microfinance includes commercialization as part of its network, while 
commercialization itself relies upon a network of techniques, skills, and personnel. 
Bangladesh consensus microfinance, in turn, contests the process of commercialization, 
and relies upon different networks--for instance, coalitions with governmental and 
nongovernmental entities that offer cheap publically or privately subsidized loans to 
Bangladesh camp MFIs--to bring microfinance into the fold of formal, accessible 
financial markets.144 Within both camps, then, MFIs disperse some of the risk inherent in 
microlending onto other actors--and yet, in both camps, the "microfinance subject" 
herself also shares the risk that MFIs create. This involves the creation of different 
microfinance riskscapes, or ways in which the industry capitalizes on and relates to risk. 
                                                        
143
 Two private partnerships with Grameen merit a brief mention here. The first is Grameen's partnership 
with Danone, which Yunus credits as his inspiration for developing "social business" as a concept (Yunus 
2007). In this partnership, Danone worked with Grameen's network of borrowers and employees to provide 
low-cost food to Bangladeshi markets, and the profits were in turn channeled back into the business (the 
hallmark of social businesses). Within this partnership, then, Bangladesh consensus prioritization of social 
benefits is reflected in the incentive structure of this new "social business."  Yet Grameen's ill-fated 
partnership with Monsanto also demonstrates the dangers of the Bangladesh camp's balance between 
fiduciary considerations and social benefits, as the use of Grameen's networks to enforce Monsanto's seed-
buying regulations struck many outside the industry as coercive. The partnership was ultimately abandoned 
due to widespread outcry over this policy. 
144
 Henriksen 2013. 
  
50
In what follows, I explore the relation between the market for this form of risk and its 
bearing on individual clients. 
 Different markets for microfinance produce different relations between MFIs and 
subjects and different subjectivities. Young's argument that NGOs in the Global South 
are engaged in "programming"145 also pertains to the work of MFIs in constituting 
"microfinance subjects." Grameen's "Sixteen Decisions"146 offers an example of the 
MFI's attempt to make clients internalize (literally, through memorization and repetition) 
entrepreneurial values. Yet the Sixteen Decisions also demonstrate how the constitution 
of "microfinance subjects" differs from the creation of the "liberal subjectivity" Williams 
identifies, since many of the Decisions address social issues (poor health, unsanitary 
living conditions, lack of access to education, and so on) that relate to the "microfinance 
subject" not only as an entrepreneur but also as a provider for her family and 
community.147  
 There is, however, a rift here as well in terms of how Bangladesh and post-
Washington MFIs seek to equip their subjects. Post-Washington camp MFIs prioritize 
both outreach (offering microfinance to as many potential clients as possible) and 
providing as broad an array of financial services as possible to clients, especially savings. 
Bangladesh camp MFIs, on the other hand, often provide skills training to clients in their 
formation as entrepreneurs, as well as services relating to their social and poverty-
alleviation goals, such as family planning and working with clients to access education.148 
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Furthermore, while some Bangladesh camp MFIs have moved towards offering a broader 
array of financial services as well, the Bangladesh consensus prioritization of credit 
remains evident in Yunus' reformulation of the "microfinance revolution" as the 
"microcredit revolution." The divergent skills and services with which MFIs equip 
"microfinance subjects" reflect the divergent ways in which the Bangladesh and post-
Washington camps on microfinance imagine their clients' subjectivities, and especially 
what clients must escape to realize this subjectivity. Post-Washington camp MFIs 
prioritize the provision of financial services and outreach since within this consensus the 
"microfinance subject" suffers primarily due to her lack of access to capital, whereas for 
Bangladesh camp MFIs, alleviating not only poverty (through financial services) but also 
its consequences (through social services) remains central to its model. 
 The differences in how the Bangladesh and post-Washington camps imagine 
microfinance subjectivity is reflected not only in the imagination of clients, but also in 
the relation between the "microfinance subject" and the MFI field agent charged with 
enforcing repayment. In the case of Grameen, field agents supplement (or, in cases where 
individual contracts are offered in lieu of group lending, replace) the social pressure of 
lending circles. Yet Grameen's employees also monitor clients' adherence to the social 
norms and objectives set out in the Sixteen Decisions. Grameen thus rewards staff 
members based on whether their clients meet certain social thresholds, such as keeping 
their children in school.149 Post-Washington MFIs, conversely, often hire "external 
agents"150 to recruit new clients and enforce repayment, and in some cases these agents' 
compensation is tied to repayment rates. Furthermore, critics have called attention to the 
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social harm of the most extreme forms of enforcement practiced by commercial MFIs, 
such as pressuring borrowers to commit suicide or sell children into prostitution to pay 
off debts.  The difference in how MFIs imagine microfinance subjectivity creates a stark 
contrast in the kind of personnel MFIs deploy to enforce repayment, and how these 
personnel relate to clients and their families. 
 Divergent constructions of microfinance subjectivity also play into the techniques 
MFIs deploy to discipline subjects. Both the "best practices" and critical literature on 
microfinance have devoted some attention to how MFIs ensure high repayment rates and 
instill entrepreneurial identity and values. While I argued in Chapter 1 that the concept of 
social capital reframes financial interventions in terms of social issues, I now turn to the 
ways in which "social capital" refers to a set of technologies and practices the 
microfinance industry uses to realize the conditions of its own possibility. Previous 
debates about microfinance and social capital have revolved around the question of 
whether the concept of "social capital" has analytical value for describing successful 
microfinance programs and the social relations that MFIs draw upon to establish their 
practices.151 Yet these debates often overlook the productive aspects of social capital 
discourse and what it makes possible as a concept as well as part of the sociotechnical 
agencements underpinning microfinance. 
 This inattention to the role of "social capital" in microfinance agencements is 
especially important because this role has changed over the course of the industry's 
expansion. Yunus' key innovation in making microfinance a global industry, as noted in 
Chapter 1, was arranging borrowers in a group where access to credit for any one 
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member was contingent upon repayment from the entire group, thus reconfiguring social 
norms in relation to lending circles. It was the transformation of social relations into a 
form of collateral known as "social capital" that so many Grameen "clones" emulated in 
the 1980s and 1990s, allowing the fledgling industry to rapidly scale up.152 After the 
development donor community's turn to social issues around the turn of the millennium, 
microfinance advocates reframed this disciplinary mechanism in terms of social capital: 
now, microentrepreneurs offered "social capital" as a form of collateral.153 Paradoxically, 
this formulation coincided with a move in the industry, during the mid 2000s, away from 
group lending and towards individual contracts.154 
 Yet, as demonstrated by the behavior of MFI collectors during the Andhra 
Pradesh crisis, social pressures and the threat of losing respect and standing in a 
community--concepts pioneered by Yunus in order to ensure the success of his lending 
circles--continued to play a role in enforcing individual repayment. Egregious and 
predatory MFI behavior (for instance, encouraging insolvent borrowers to commit suicide 
so a MFI could collect the life insurance) was made possible in part by conceiving of 
social relations as a form of collateral that MFIs could use to ensure repayment as long as 
they pulled the proper cultural strings. These technologies serve to constitute and 
discipline "microfinance subjects" through the strategic deployment and reshaping of 
social relations. Yunus' appeal to communal pressure to ensure client honesty and 
frugality in his account of Grameen's expansion is just one example of how a MFI can 
capitalize on cultural knowledge. 
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 The practice of finding "what works"155 to enforce repayment within a given 
culture or community allows MFIs to deploy local knowledge as a potentially coercive 
disciplinary mechanism. The role of "social capital" in enabling particular lending 
technologies shows that the standard critical approach to the concept of social capital--
that it distorts or misrepresents social relations--overlooks the need to understand the 
concept in terms of its productive implications within the agencements underpinning 
microfinance. Though the concept has been widely discarded in terms of its analytical 
value by World Bank theorists, the microfinance industry continues to use it to describe a 
set of practices and outcomes.156 A performative approach to the role "social capital" 
plays in the agencement of microfinance requires recognizing, then, that it results not 
only from "researchers behaving badly,"157 but also from the creation of technologies that 
allow the industry to realize the conditions of its own possibility. 
 In terms of building institutional support within microfinance agencements, 
"social capital" also provides a discursive framework for understanding microfinance and 
building broad coalitions behind different forms of the "microfinance revolution." The 
reformulation of financial services in terms of social issues has brought IOs whose 
purviews expand well beyond development (notably the United Nations, which declared 
2005 the International Year of Microcredit) into networks and coalitions of microfinance 
actors. By emphasizing the social impacts of microfinance, the language of social capital 
also helped the microfinance industry--and even large development institutions like the 
World Bank--counter antidevelopment movements. 
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 Furthermore, as noted earlier in this chapter, using "social capital" as collateral 
requires no physical collateral, thus making it possible for financial institutions to offer 
credit to poor borrowers in the Global South. As Ananya Roy notes, this innovation 
represents the creation of a new "riskscape;"158 or, to put it in performative terms, using 
technologies that deploy "social capital" allow banks and financial firms to capitalize on 
new forms of risk and discipline clients who do not adhere to the industry's construction 
of a "microfinance subject." Once this riskscape had been opened, MFIs explored new 
ways of enforcing high repayment rates, such as through the use of "culture" and police 
force. These technologies also allowed for rapid expansion and commercialization of the 
industry, as financial backers were more willing to back MFIs when it became clear that 
MFIs could enforce repayment. "Social capital" thus linked to another set of technologies 
allowing MFIs to diffuse the risks of microlending. 
 Yet examining the role "social capital" has played in the microfinance industry 
also offers instances of what Donald MacKenzie refers to as "counter-performativity,"159 
or in Callon's terms a crisis in the agencements underpinning microfinance.160 Using the 
technologies of "social capital" to enforce repayment also allowed for MFIs to intervene 
in ways that, as I argued in Chapter 1, ultimately made abusive lending practices more 
likely. For all his protesting about interest rates and the "new usury" of overly-
commercialized MFIs, Yunus' innovation--deploying social pressures to ensure 
repayment in the absence of physical collateral--paved the way for further innovations 
along these lines. These innovations ultimately resulted in an agencement that suffered 
repeated crises due to its inability to manage the tension between "empowerment money" 
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and the disciplinary power MFIs needed to use to create this kind of entrepreneurial 
empowerment. After each crisis--and in particular after the Andhra Pradesh crisis--the 
industry reframed its handling of this tension, and in particular claimed that these crises 
resulted from too much commercialization and wholesale importation of "Wall Street 
values." This narrative offers a plausible explanation for abusive lending practices; but 
from a performative perspective, it also points to the way that the particular agencements 
of microfinance, constituted in part by the language and technologies referred to as 
"social capital," played out in ways that microfinance industry consultants, observers, 
experts, and advocates could not have expected. 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have attempted to bridge a gap in the critical literature between the 
economic performativity theorists, who resist the reification of neoliberal power, while 
also accounting for real power disparities and the alliance between the microfinance 
industry and large IOs and IFOs. The picture of the industry that emerges involves 
different camps deploying various skills, technologies, discourses, and networks with a 
view towards constituting a "microfinance subject." Any serious analysis of the 
microfinance industry must account for its relation to "institutional power,"161 
considering the support emanating from the World Bank and United Nations, as well as 
the unique role of institutions close to the industry such as CGAP.  
Yet while this power may structure struggles between different camps within the 
microfinance industry and between the industry and microfinance critics, it does not 
determine them, as the resurgence of the "weaker" Bangladesh consensus after the 
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Andhra Pradesh crisis shows. With this perspective in mind, I turn in the final chapter to 
the implications of my analysis, before identifying alternatives to the dominant paradigms 
in microfinance. 
 In this chapter, I have sketched a picture of some of the agencements 
underpinning the microfinance industry. In offering a performative perspective on 
microfinance practice, I have attempted to offer a picture of microfinance practice that 
emphasizes the relations between clients, MFIs, the World Bank, CGAP, Grameen, and 
so on. In the next chapter, then, I turn to a few kinds of institutions that are underpinned 
by and in turn constitute agencements that potentially offer greater agency to clients and 
pose less of a threat of exploitation than either Bangladesh or post-Washington consensus 
MFIs, dependent as they are on turning social relations into a "riskscape."162 
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Conclusion 
 
Asked in an interview what she thought the results of the UN’s Year of 
Microcredit were, Christina Barrineau, senior technical advisor to the Year of 
Microcredit, said: "people stopped seeing microcredit only as a ten-dollar loan to 
a woman buying a goat, and started seeing the poor as masterful business people, 
tremendously entrepreneurial--people who have fundamental business skills and 
really warrant access to financial services that will help them grow their 
wealth."163 
 
Barrineau's succinct articulation of the notion of the entrepreneurial poor underscores the 
role the microfinance industry has played in producing and disseminating this discourse. 
Much of the critical debate over microfinance has revolved around the productive effects 
of this (mis)representation. In this paper, I have argued for a need to reframe the 
discourse of the microfinance industry in terms of the social and material forces that 
mediate the industry's attempts to produce this subject. In the first three chapters, I have 
explored certain aspects of these agencements in order to argue that the microfinance 
industry's self-presentation fails to capture the complexity of constituting "microfinance 
subjects," and instead reframes new forms and distributions of risk in terms of 
"empowerment," "human development," or "Progress out of Poverty." 
 Having examined some aspects of microfinance agencements, is worth briefly 
revisiting the selective history of microfinance offered in Chapter 1. Although financial 
services for the poor existed in many places in some form or another well before the 
twentieth century, what is generally understood as contemporary "microfinance" began 
with Muhammad Yunus' experiment with lending to the rural poor in Bangladesh. Yunus 
realized that peer monitoring and enforcement could substitute for the physical collateral 
that formal financial institutions generally required. Yunus' struggle to have microfinance 
taken seriously as a development intervention occurred against a backdrop of changing 
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development paradigms. As the end of the Cold War and resulting neoliberal shift 
displaced the emphasis on human capital, microfinance offered development experts a 
way to shift the burden of downsized civil servants from state to market. Unlike many 
neoliberal development interventions, however, microfinance also suited the development 
donor community's subsequent turn towards social issues and the Millennium 
Development Goals. Because of the microfinance industry's ability to appeal to 
competing development agendas, the industry assembled an unusually broad coalition of 
actors. 
 Yet the diversity of actors supporting "microfinance" within the development 
donor community belies the highly fractured nature of the microfinance industry. In order 
to examine a key fracture within the industry, Chapter 2 analyzed two "monuments" of 
microfinance discourse--Marguerite Robinson's The Microfinance Revolution and 
Muhammad Yunus' Creating a World Without Poverty--that represent the divergence 
between the post-Washington and Bangladesh camps on microfinance. Enthusiasm for 
microfinance in the abstract generated heated debate within the industry about the risks of 
commercial microfinance, and whether the rapid scaling of microfinance that 
commercialization enabled justified these risks. The texts thus differ in how they frame 
appropriate microfinance interventions, or indeed whether the other camp's interventions 
can properly be considered microfinance.  
 In spite of these differences, both texts offer a fundamentally similar 
understanding of poor people throughout the Global South as potential entrepreneurs 
waiting only for access to capital in order to grow their assets--in other words, as 
"microfinance subjects." In analyzing the microfinance industry in terms of the 
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subjectivities it produces, I borrowed from David Williams' theorization of the "liberal 
subject." Williams argues that NGOs and civil society in the Global South underpin 
neoliberal development not by offering new forms of economic and social organization, 
but by reconstituting subjects, or to borrow from Tom Young, "programming" them. 
Williams' analysis points to the role NGOs and other development institutions play in this 
process of constitution, and I have thus looked to the corollary role of microfinance 
institutions in creating "microfinance subjects," whose subjectivity is influenced but not 
determined by liberalism. 
 Williams' emphasis on the role of institutions, however, risks obscuring other 
social and material forces at play in the constitution of liberal (or microfinance) subjects. 
For this reason, I turned to the work of Michel Callon and economic performativity 
theory to argue that microfinance subjectivity emerges out of competing agencements. 
Understanding this subjectivity in terms of microfinance agencements points to the 
diverse technologies, personnel, discourses, and arrangements of power underpinning the 
constitution of microfinance subjects. In using this theoretical framework to understand 
the microfinance industry, I drew on two recent studies of microfinance that have 
deployed a similar method: Aitken's study of the microfinance industry's incorporation of 
Anglo-American financial technique, and Henriksen's examination of the relation 
between knowledge production and dissemination and the creation of a market for 
microfinance. Both studies offer a new perspective on microfinance practice at the level 
of markets and institutions. In my analysis, I have taken this framework to bear on a 
different aspect of microfinance practice, namely the theorization and production of 
microfinance subjects. This project, then, reframes previous work on the microfinance 
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industry's relation to its clients and builds on the nascent literature examining 
microfinance practice from a performative perspective. 
 The performative framework also offers a way of understanding new forms of 
microfinance agencements. As both the history of microfinance outlined in Chapter 1 and 
the analysis of microfinance agencements in Chapter 3 showed, the social and material 
forces underpinning microfinance practice are not static. Changing technologies and the 
importation of new financial technique into microfinance agencements have impacted not 
only the scope of microfinance practice but also fundamentally altered the way the 
industry relates to clients. These relations continue to change with the expansion of 
websites such as kiva.org making microfinance accessible not only to financial actors in 
the Global North but anyone with access to the Internet.164 Whether and how this model 
might facilitate new microfinance agencements, or how it would change existing 
agencements into which it is incorporated, merits further attention from a performative 
perspective. 
 Recognizing that agencements are not static, further research might ask whether 
varying microfinance agencements necessitate the production of a "microfinance 
subject," or would at least mitigate the risks inherent to clients in the process of 
constituting these subjects. While this project has not purported to offer policy solutions, 
I believe contesting the notion of the "entrepreneurial poor" and identifying the risks 
associated with producing microfinance subjects opens space for new microfinance 
agencements to emerge that offer more meaningful forms of empowerment to clients. 
While the agencements underpinning microfinance can have good or bad results, and 
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often unexpectedly so, these agencements ultimately differ greatly in their ability to 
empower clients and in the risks they hold for "microfinance subjects." 
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